User:Phlsph7/Metaphysics - Criticism

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Criticism

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Despite its status as one of the main branches of philosophy, metaphysics has received numerous criticisms putting into question its status as a legitimate field of inquiry.[1] One type of criticism states that metaphysical inquiry is impossible because humans do not have the cognitive capacities needed to access the ultimate nature of reality.[2] This line of thought leads to a form of skepticism about the possibility of metaphysical knowledge. It is often followed by empiricists like Hume, who argue that there is no good source of metaphysical knowledge since metaphysics lies outside the field of empirical knowledge and relies on dubious intuitions about the realm beyond sensory experience. A closely related concern about the unreliability of metaphysical theorizing is that there a deep and lasting disagreements about metaphysical issues, indicating a lack of overall progress.[3]

Another criticism holds that the problem lies not with human cognitive abilities but with metaphysical statements themselves, which are claimed to be neither true nor false but meaningless. According to logical positivists, for instance, the meaning of a statement is given by the procedure used to verify it, usually in terms of the observations that would confirm it. Based on this controversial assumption, they argue that metaphysical statements are meaningless since they do not make predictions about experience.[4]

A slightly weaker position allows that metaphysical statements have meaning while holding that metaphysical disagreements are merely verbal disputes about different ways to describe the world. According to this view, the disagreement in the metaphysics of composition about whether there are tables or only particles arranged table-wise is a trivial debate about linguistic preferences without any substantive consequences for the nature of reality.[5] The position that metaphysical disputes have no meaning or no substantial point is called deflationism.[6] This view is opposed by serious metaphysicians, who contend that metaphysical disputes are about the underlying features of reality.[7] A closely related debate between ontological realists and anti-realists concerns the question of whether there are any objective facts that determine which metaphysical theories are true.[8] A different criticism, formulated by pragmatists, sees the fault of metaphysics not in its cognitive ambitions or the meaninglessness of its statements, but in its practical irrelevance and lack of usefulness.[9]

It is questionable to what extent the criticisms of metaphysics affect the discipline as a whole or only certain issues or approaches in it. For example, it could be the case that certain metaphysical disputes are merely verbal while others are substantive.[10]

Souces

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  • Macarthur, David (2020). "Richard Rorty and (the End of) Metaphysics (?)". In Malachowski, Alan (ed.). A Companion to Rorty. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 978-1-118-97217-5.
  • Kriegel, Uriah (2016). "Philosophy as Total Axiomatics: Serious Metaphysics, Scrutability Bases, and Aesthetic Evaluation". Journal of the American Philosophical Association. 2 (2). doi:10.1017/apa.2016.8.
  • Manley, David (2009). "1. Introduction: A Guided Tour of Metametaphysics". Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Clarendon Press. ISBN 978-0-19-954604-6.
  • Chalmers, David J. "3. Ontological Anti-Realism". Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Clarendon Press. ISBN 978-0-19-954604-6.
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  2. ^ van Inwagen, Sullivan & Bernstein 2023, § 5. Is Metaphysics Possible?
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  6. ^ Manley 2009, p. 4
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  10. ^ Rea 2021, pp. 215–216, 223–224