User:Mhatopzz/East Timor civil war
| East Timor civil war | ||||||||
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| Part of the Cold War | ||||||||
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| Belligerents | ||||||||
| FRETILIN |
UDT APODETI | Portuguese Timor | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | ||||||||
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Estimated:
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The East Timor civil war was an inter-political party conflict fought in 1975 between the conservative União Democrática Timorense (UDT) and the left-leaning Fretilin. The then colony of Portuguese Timor was preparing for independence at the time. With a Fretilin-led majority emerging in trial elections, the UDT attempted an armed coup on August 11. Fretilin emerged victorious from the ensuing three weeks of fighting. 1500 to 3000 people died as a result of the conflict, according to estimates by the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (CAVR). The commission also recorded 787 noncombat deaths as a result of the civil war. Most of the violence occurred in the districts of Liquiçá, Ermera, Ainaro, Manufahi, and Manatuto.
Background
[edit]After the Carnation Revolution in Portugal in 1974, the colonial empire was to be dissolved and the countries were released into independence. In Portuguese Timor, the major parties that developed were the UDT and Fretilin, which initially worked together with the Portuguese colonial administration. In addition, there were small parties, such as APODETI, which was financed by Indonesia and supported by its consulate in Dili. In the spring of 1975, Fretilin was able to rely on a majority of the population throughout East Timor. On March 13, 1975, elections were held in the Lautém district as part of the decolonization program. The goal was to replace the traditional ruling systems. In this pilot project for local elections, there were no party lists or candidates. Voters simply threw pebbles into candidates' baskets to cast their ballots. Fretilin-affiliated candidates clearly prevailed here against UDT candidates.
While the other Portuguese colonies were gradually released into independence, implementation in East Timor was delayed. In the meantime, the Indonesian military intelligence service Bakin under General Ali Murtopo was intrigued with Operation Komodo (Indonesian Operasi Komodo, after the Komodo dragon) and fueled the conflict between the different political camps. Indonesian officers visited Portuguese Timor for this purpose. In April 1975, a delegation led by Colonel Sugianto and Colonel Suharto Pitut met in Dili with Portuguese Governor Mário Lemos Pires and representatives of the Fretilin, UDT, and APODETI parties. In the same month, General Ali Murtopo invited UDT and Fretilin envoys to Jakarta. Immediately after the party representatives returned to Timor, the UDT Central Commission met and decided to end the coalition with Fretilin. In May, Indonesian intelligence again invited UDT members for talks and made it clear that Indonesia would never accept an independent government with the participation of Fretilin, which was considered communist. The perceived "communist threat" during the Cold War period and shortly after the Vietnam War served as a rationale for those UDT leaders to leave the coalition with Fretilin on May 27, 1975. On June 6, Indonesian troops, disguised as UDT fighters, occupied the Oe-Cusse Ambeno enclave. Portugal's lack of reaction confirmed the Indonesian assessment that there was no longer any need to fear intervention from the colonial power.
On July 25, UDT leaders Domingos de Oliveira and João Viegas Carrascalão again met with Bakin representatives. Here, General Murtopo told the East Timorese that Fretilin was planning to seize power by force on August 15, and if measures were not taken to clear Fretilin out of the way, Indonesia would invade East Timor. But if the UDT cleaned up its "backyard," Indonesia would recognize East Timor's right to self-determination. Faced with this threat and the expected defeat in free elections, the UDT decided to stage a coup (Operaçao Sakonar). Although El Tari, the Indonesian governor in Kupang, warned Carrascalão on his way back from Jakarta that the annexation of East Timor was already a done deal, they wanted to deprive Indonesia of any pretext for an invasion. Looking back on the events, Marí Alkatiri, then a member of the Fretilin Central Committee and later Prime Minister of East Timor, stated:
"Without outside interference, there would have been no civil war."
Conflict
[edit]Coup attempt
[edit]On August 11, UDT members took weapons from the police and declared the takeover, occupying the seaport and airport, the state radio station, Rádio Marconi, the telephone exchange, the central power station and the water reservoir. Only the naval radio station remained in the hands of the colonial government. A list of demands was then presented to the Portuguese administration. The UDT emphasized that the operation was only intended to remove extremist elements in order to prevent Indonesia from intervening. From Dili, the armed actions spread throughout the colony. 80 members of the Fretilin were detained by the UDT at its headquarters in Rua de Palapaço, among them Xanana Gusmão, who later became the first president of East Timor after the Indonesian occupation. Another dozen Fretilin supporters were murdered, such as José Lobato, the younger brother of Nicolau Lobato. In total, the UDT held several hundred political opponents prisoner throughout the colony. Many prisoners died under unclear circumstances. The UDT initially had less than 200 men at its disposal, but Governor Pires did nothing, although he had more than 1700 soldiers at his disposal.
The UDT and sympathizers from the Portuguese colonial army formed the Movimento para Unidade e Independência de Timor-Dili (Movement for Unity and Independence of Timor-Dili, MUITD in Portuguese) on 13 August 1975. It planned to dissolve all pro-independence parties and integrate their members into the MUITD. In the first days after the coup, the UDT was able to win over police chief Rui Alberto Maggiolo Gouveia and various military units, such as the companies in Baucau and Lospalos. UDT President Lopes da Cruz was arrested by UDT leaders João Viegas Carrascalão and Domingos de Oliveira, as he was suspected of collaborating with Indonesia. The suspicion was later confirmed.
On August 16, the UDT called for the expulsion of all communists from the territory, including "those in the Portuguese governor's office". It demanded the repeal of Decree 7/75, which set the timetable for the release of Portuguese Timor to independence by 1978, and the resumption of negotiations on the colony's independence. On August 17, Major Mota, head of the Political Affairs Office, and Major Jónatas were sent back to Lisbon. The two representatives of the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA) were accused of being the communist wing in the colonial government.
Counter coup by Fretilin
[edit]Fretilin initially retreated to its stronghold in Aileu, south of Dili. The army's training center (Centro de Instrução) was also located here. In just a few days, the party succeeded in mobilizing the majority of the population, which had been shocked by the coup. Most of the Timorese who were serving in the Portuguese army deserted and joined the Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste FALINTIL (Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor), the military arm of Fretilin. The UDT received support from the police and only a few army units. In the end, around 1,500 UDT supporters faced 2,000 Fretilin fighters on August 20.. Both parties had equipped themselves with weapons from military stocks. The Fretilin also used 81 mm mortars.
FALINTIL fighters occupied the Portuguese military headquarters in Taibesi and captured the Portuguese soldiers, including the deputy commander-in-chief of the troops on Timor on 20 August 1975. Street fighting broke out between the UDT and Fretilin in Dili, although the fronts were very confused. While APODETI and UDT fought against Fretilin in Same, Fretilin and UDT were allies against APODETI in Atsabe and Fretilin and APODETI against UDT in Dili. On August 27, the Fretilin took control of Dili. The UDT initially retreated to the airport and in early September to the west through Liquiçá towards Indonesia. Pires had evacuated the last Portuguese administrative and military personnel to the island of Atauro off the coast of Dili on the night of August 26-27. The reason for this was a telegram from Lisbon warning of the danger of hostage-taking and advising people to flee to the safe island. More than 1700 civilians were brought to Darwin by ship in August. From here, Pires tried unsuccessfully to mediate between the conflicting parties. He was urged by the Fretilin to return and push ahead with decolonization, but he insisted on waiting for instructions from Lisbon. In this way, he wanted to avoid a guerrilla war against the Portuguese government in East Timor. However, it was not until early October that Pires received support from the mother country in the form of the corvette Afonso Cerqueira. UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim unsuccessfully called on the parties to the conflict to call a ceasefire.
Portuguese colonials exile to Atauro
[edit]Atauro became the new headquarters of Governor Pires. From the island, he tried unsuccessfully to mediate between the conflicting parties. Pires was urged by the Fretilin to return and push ahead with decolonisation, but he insisted on waiting for instructions from Lisbon. In this way, Pires wanted to avoid a guerrilla war against the Portuguese government in East Timor. However, there were no instructions from the mother country.
Pires now only had 12 soldiers from the army, 27 sailors and 64 paratroopers[38] and lacked the infrastructure to set up the administration effectively. The naval commander noted that the personnel were poorly housed and the food was very bad. In addition, it was initially not possible to establish a radio link with the outside world.
Minister António de Almeida Santos reached Atauro on 28 August. Attempts to make contact with the UDT failed, as its leaders were already on the run. At least an agreement was reached with the Fretilin on the release of Portuguese prisoners, but the minister spoke to Lisbon against recognising the Fretilin as the sole representative of the East Timorese. On the same day, the Comoro was sent to Timor to evacuate Portuguese from the western parts of the colony. In Oecusse, some military personnel and civilians were rescued. In Batugade, the UDT flag flew at the fort. The boat was met on the shore by armed men who pointed their weapons at the Comoro. Europeans who wanted to be evacuated were not to be seen, whereupon the boat travelled on without landing. They returned to Atauro on 30 August.
On 29 August, Pires was forced to fetch fuel for the boats and food from Kupang in West Timor. The Tibar and the Lifau remained in the Indonesian port city under the command of Leiria Pinto from 30 August to 4 September. Before his departure, the lieutenant captain delivered a private letter from Lemos Pires to his counterpart, Colonel El Tari. At the meeting, Tari expressed his concern about the situation in Dili and his dismay at Portugal for not allowing Indonesia to pacify the conflict. The Indonesian capture of 23 Portuguese officers and three civilians provided further potential for conflict. The Indonesian army had authorised them to cross the border in August, but then interned them in camps. Portugal refused to make any concessions without releasing the hostages. While the civilians were released relatively soon, the military personnel remained in captivity until after the official annexation of East Timor by Indonesia was announced on 17 July 1976.
A naval radio was stationed on the MacDili, which had returned from Darwin, to maintain contact with the Australian city, while a radio on Atauro ensured communication with the freighter. On 8 September, as agreed, the Laleia was to pick up the 25 Portuguese soldiers from Dili who had been held as prisoners by the Fretilin. In Dili, the mood of the Fretilin fighters, who meanwhile controlled the harbour, was hostile and irritable towards the Portuguese. Eventually it was agreed that, with the help of the International Red Cross, the Portuguese prisoners would be handed over to the Portuguese consul in Darwin, from where they could return to Lisbon. On the way back, the Laleia spotted an Indonesian destroyer in the waters between Atauro and Dili.
As the defeat of the UDT in the civil war became apparent, 10,000 to 20,000 people fled to West Timor in Indonesia, where they found themselves under the control of the Indonesian military. A total of 1,500 to 3,000 people died in the fighting. Two groups in Maliana and Suai drew up proclamations calling for the colony to be integrated into Indonesia, and the leaders of the UDT and smaller parties who had fled also drew up a petition in Batugade calling on Indonesia to do so. The UDT leader Mário Viegas Carrascalão later explained that the signature had been forced under pressure from the Indonesians, in some cases by force of arms.
After the de facto seizure of power, the Fretilin quickly restored peace and order thanks to the high level of support among the population. The population's food supply was also secured. Former UDT supporters who had remained now worked together with the Fretilin. However, the party also had to bear responsibility for the numerous prisoners from the civil war and had difficulties in preventing its own cadres from being abused. Fretilin officially recognised Portuguese sovereignty over the colony. The Portuguese flag still flew at the seat of government and the governor's office remained unused. However, his administration only existed in Atauro. The Fretilin repeatedly emphasised Portugal's authority over the colony and called for negotiations to continue decolonisation. In the meantime, Indonesia began with incursions into the border area and from October onwards with the occupation of border towns. On 16 September, Fretilin repeated its call for negotiations with Portugal. In addition, a conference with Portugal, East Timor, Indonesia and Australia was to "dispel rumours and misunderstandings".
Minister António de Almeida Santos left Atauro again on 22 September. He spoke out in favour of negotiations with all three East Timorese parties, but Fretilin was no longer prepared to hold four-way talks as it already controlled the colony. Fretilin only wanted to negotiate with Portugal and Indonesia would not allow the UDT and APODETI leaders who had fled to them to negotiate with Portugal. Pires accompanied the minister to Lisbon and tried again to persuade the Portuguese government to intervene, but after nine days he returned to Atauro without success. By mid-September, the Fretilin was in control of most of the colony.
Towards the end
[edit]The civil war effectively ended on 24 September 1975 when Fretilin was able to secure East Timor, which would cause about 10,000 to 20,000 East Timorese to fled to West Timor in Indonesia, who are mainly supporters of the UDT, APODETI and the monarchist party KOTA, which had supported the UDT during the civil war. The official Indonesian figure of 40,000 is generally considered to be too high. East Timorese refugees estimated it at 10,000 to 30,000. In Baucau, UDT supporters hijacked an Australian plane on September 4 and forced the pilots to bring a total of 44 refugees to Australia. In West Timor, the refugees were caught up in Indonesia's annexation policy. Investigations revealed that some civilians were also forced by the UDT to "flee" to West Timor to be recruited by the Indonesian army. This is said to have been 1000 people from Ermera alone. Between 1500 and 3000 people died. Western journalists, Australian and Japanese politicians and representatives of the International Red Cross who visited the country confirmed to Fretilin representatives that from September to the beginning of December they made serious efforts to deal with the social and economic problems in order to keep the administration of the territory running.
Fretilin and UDT were later forced to admit that both had committed human rights violations during the civil war. Most of the murders were committed by the Fretilin, but UDT supporters also committed murders. For example, captured opponents were murdered. The mass graves of UDT and APODETI members were found in Aileu and Same at the beginning of 1976. On August 27, 1975, UDT fighters killed eleven Fretilin supporters on the beach of Meti Oan near Wedauberek (Manufahi). The Fretilin supporters had been captured on 11 August, some of whom belonged to the Fretilin youth organization UNETIM. When it was learned that Fretilin fighters were approaching, the prisoners were taken from Same to the coast and killed there. One victim of the Wedauberek massacre was Domingos Lobato, another brother of Nicolau Lobato and president of UNETIM. On September 1, around 30 people were killed by UDT fighters in the Klaek Reman and Aifu massacre. The murders had less of a political background. Rather, the conflict was used to settle old scores. According to later interviews with party leaders, there was never a deliberate policy of murdering opponents. The violence came primarily from the cadres. However, the parties allowed the crimes to take place without criticism. José Ramos-Horta, a Fretilin leader who had been abroad for negotiations during the civil war, tried unsuccessfully after his return to persuade the extreme forces of the party, with victory behind them, to form a new alliance with the defeated UDT. He also tried to stop the mistreatment of UDT prisoners and arranged for the repatriation of Portuguese soldiers who had been detained by the Fretilin. He also ensured the orderly departure of Timorese children to Australia who had been separated from their parents.
During the civil war, Indonesia tried to persuade Portugal to hand over the colony or at least to authorize the deployment of the Indonesian army. Although Portugal refused, the talks and the associated hope of a peaceful settlement prevented the weakening colonial power from taking direct action against the Indonesian infiltration. The Indonesian capture of 23 Portuguese officers and three civilians provided further potential for conflict. The Indonesian army had allowed them to cross the border in August, but then interned them in camps. Portugal refused to make any concessions without releasing the hostages. While the civilians were released relatively soon, the military personnel remained in captivity until after the official annexation of East Timor by Indonesia was announced on July 17, 1976
Aftermath
[edit]After the defeat of the UDT, Indonesia began to invade and occupy the border areas of East Timor with soldiers disguised as UDT fighters. Five Western journalists who witnessed the invasion in Balibo (the so-called Balibo Five) were murdered by Indonesian soldiers. Hoping for international support, Fretilin unilaterally proclaimed independence on November 28. Indonesia responded by announcing that the leaders of the UDT, APODETI, KOTA and the Workers' Party had signed the so-called Balibo Declaration on November 30, 1975, calling for East Timor's annexation to Indonesia. However, the declaration, a draft by the Indonesian secret service, was signed in Bali and not in Balibo, probably under pressure from the Indonesian government. The signatories were more or less prisoners of Indonesia. Xanana Gusmão called the paper the "Balibohong Declaration", a play on the Indonesian word for "lie".
On December 7, Indonesia began the open invasion and occupation of the country with Operation Seroja. During the retreat from Dili, Fretilin carried out mass executions of prisoners from the civil war. Although there was no official order from the Fretilin leadership to kill the prisoners, the consensus was that they hindered Fretilin's mobility and posed a threat to the resistance against Indonesia. In 1976, the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia was declared. As a result of the occupation and the fighting with FALINTIL, an estimated 183,000 of the 800,000 inhabitants of East Timor lost their lives by the time Indonesia withdrew in 1999.
The UDT leader João Viegas Carrascalão took full responsibility for the coup and its consequences when he testified before the East Timor Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 2003