Nicomachean Ethics: Difference between revisions

The first page of the Nicomachean Ethics in Greek and Latin, from a 1566 edition

Nicomachean Ethics is the name normally given to the most well-known work by Aristotle on ethics. It plays a prominent role in defining Aristotelian ethics, and is widely considered one of the most important historical philosophical works, having for example a very important impact upon European Medieval Philosophy, and hence indirectly upon Modern Philosophy.

The work consists of ten books and is understood to be based on notes said to be from his lectures at the Lyceum which were either edited by or dedicated to Aristotle's son, Nicomachus. In many ways this work parallels the similar Eudemian Ethics, which has only eight books, and the two works can be fruitfully compared.

Aristotle describes his ethical work as being different from his other kinds of study, because it is not just for the sake of contemplating what things are, but rather to actually become good ourselves. It is therefore practical rather than theoretical in the original Aristotelian senses of these terms. It is in this sense similar to Aristotle's writings on Politics, which also aims at people becoming good, though less focused on individuals.

The highest good for humans, the highest aim of all human practical thinking, is in turn identified by Aristotle as eudaimonia, a Greek word often translated as well-being or happiness. Aristotle in turn argues that happiness is properly understood as a way of being in action in the human psychē, traditionally translated as "soul", in accordance with virtue (Greek aretē, sometimes translated as "excellence"), in a stable way that endures throughout life. Happiness therefore depends upon being in accordance with virtue, and if there are several virtues, upon the best and most complete or perfect of them.

Aristotle eventually comes to argue that the highest of all human virtues is itself not practical, being contemplative wisdom (1177a), but he also makes it clear that the possibility of ever achieving this supreme condition is inseparable from achieving all the virtues of character, or "moral virtues".

Aristotelian Ethics is about the possibility of virtuous character, necessary if happiness is to be possible. Character is êthos in Greek, the root of the words ethics, ethical and ethos. Aristotle does not equate character with habit (ethos in Greek, with a short "e") because real character involves conscious choice, not habit. However, good habits are described as a precondition for good character, because we learn to hold a stability in our conscious choices, by first doing them, because of teachers, or experiences. By doing the right actions, we develop the right habits, and hence the right character, allowing us a better chance of achieving eudaimonia.

In Latin the habits are morae or mores, giving us words like "moral", and Aristotle's term for virtue of character (ethikē aretē) is traditionally translated as "moral virtue".

Many parts of the Nichomachean Ethics are well known in their own right.

Book 1

Book 1 begins to define the subject matter, with some very important digressions. As is typical of Aristotle, he considers common opinions and the opinions of poets and philosophers as he progresses. The introductory book is remarkable for the way in which "digressions" explaining the method which has been chosen, constantly interrupt what is apparently the main flow of discussion.

The digressions concerning who should study Ethics, and how

The digressions in this book begin by explaining the type of person who should be involved in considering this subject, and the dangers of approaching it wrongly, and eventually become an explanation of why the Ethics is being structured in a way which may seem unphilosophical according to the norms of Aristotle's teacher, Plato:-

Chapter 3 is a digression about accuracy and at the same time about whether ethics can be treated in an objective way, pointing out that the "things that are beautiful and just, about which politics investigates, involve great disagreement and inconsistency, so that they are thought to belong only to convention and not to nature". For this reason Aristotle claims it is important not to demand too much precision, like the demonstrations we would demand from a mathematician, but rather to treat the beautiful and the just as "things that are so for the most part". We can do this because people are good judges of what they are acquainted with, but in turn this implies that the young (in age or in character), being inexperienced, are not suitable for study of this type of political subject.

Chapter 4 then he begins again but with so many opinions available a new digression is made, related to the previous one, asking whether we should try to argue from first principles or else "go up" towards them from what is known to us. He suggests that in this case we need to begin with what is known to us, once again emphasizing that to discuss this topic we have already had a good up-bringing.

Chapter 6 contains a famous digression in which Aristotle appears to question his "friends" who "introduced the forms", i.e. what is now known as the Theory of Forms, by which he must certainly be referring to Plato and his school, "for while both [the truth and one's friends] are loved it is a sacred thing to give the highest honor to the truth". The section is an explanation of why the Ethics will not seek "The Good" as a universal thing which all things called good have in common. Aristotle says that while all the different things called good do not seem to have the same name by chance, it is perhaps better to "let go for now" because this attempt at precision "would be more at home in another type of philosophic inquiry", and would not seem to be helpful for discussing how particular humans should act, in the same way that doctors do not need to philosophize over the definition of health in order to treat each case.

Chapter 7 ends with yet another reference to this avoidance of discussing a universal good. He remarks that "both a carpenter and a geometrician look for a right angle, but in different ways", the point being that one ought to ensure "that side issues do not become greater than the work being done". Indeed, "it is sufficient in some cases for it to be shown beautifully that something is so, in particular such things as concern first principles.... For the beginning seems to be more than half of the whole, and many of the things that are inquired after become illuminated with it". He mentions that perception of first principles can come about in many ways, including through experience in some habit (ethismōi tini).

Defining Happiness and the aim of the Ethics

The main stream of discussion starts in Chapter 1, from an assertion that all making, investigating (methodos, like the Ethics itself), all deliberate actions and choice, all aim at some good. Aristotle points to the fact that many aims are really only intermediate aims, and are desired only because they make the achievement of higher aims possible. He asserts that like archers we should try to know about our ultimate target and what kind of knowledge or capacity it requires.

In chapter 2, Aristotle points out that the highest aim, happiness, must be the same as politics should have, because what is best for an individual is less beautiful (kalos) and divine (theios) than what is good for a people (ethnos) or city (polis). The aim of political capacity should include the aim of all other pursuits, so that "this end would be the human good (tanthrōpinon agathon)". He concludes what is now known as Chapter 2 of Book 1 by stating that ethics ("our investigation" or methodos) is "in a certain way political".

In chapter 4 states that while most would agree to call the highest aim of humanity happiness (eudaimonia), and also to equate this with both living well and doing things well, there is dispute between people, and between the majority (hoi polloi) and "the wise".

Chapter 5 begins by considering first the assumption of the most people and the crudest people, that pleasure is the good and happiness. Aristotle asserts that the people who hold this opinion represent one of three distinct ways of life that are especially important:

• The slavish way of pleasure, which is the way of the majority.
• The refined and active way of politics, which aims at honor, honor itself implying the incompleteness of this way, and the divinity of those who are wise and those who know them.
• The way of contemplation, which shall be discussed elsewhere.

Aristotle also mentions two other possibilities that he argues can be put aside:

• Having virtue but being inactive, even suffering evils and misfortunes, which Aristotle says no one would consider unless they were defending a hypothesis. (As Sachs points out, this is indeed what Plato depicts Socrates doing in his Gorgias.)
• Money making, which Aristotle asserts to be a life based on aiming at what is pursued by necessity, an intermediate good.

Chapter 7 then, noting that many of the aims people would nominate are really only intermediate aims, focuses on eliminating these to consider what remains, and which things are pursued on their own account. He asserts that not only happiness itself, but also honor, pleasure, and intelligence (nous) and every virtue are all things we pursue for their own sake, for even though they lead to happiness, even if they did not we would still pursue them. Happiness in life then, includes the virtues, and he adds that it would include self-sufficiency (autarkeia), not the self-sufficiency of a hermit, but of someone with a family, friends and community. By itself this would make life choiceworthy and lacking nothing. In order to describe more clearly what happiness is like, Aristotle next asks what the work (ergon) of a human is. All living things have nutrition and growth as a work, all animals would have perceiving as part of their work, but what is more particularly human? The answer according to Aristotle is that it must involve articulate speech (logos), including both being open to persuasion by reasoning, and thinking things through. Not only will happiness involve reason, but it will also be an active being at work (energeia), not just potential happiness, and it will be over a lifetime, because "one swallow does not make a Spring".

And because happiness is being described as a work or function of humans, we can say that just as we contrast harpist with serious harpists, the person who lives well and beautifully in this actively rational an virtuous way will be a "serious" (spoudaios) human.

Chapter 8 takes up the approach justified in various digressions so far. One must approach one's beginning statement not only by looking at its conclusions, and the basis of it, but also by looking at what people say about it "for when something is true, everything that pertain to it is consonant with it, but when something is false, the truth quickly shows itself dissonant with it."

As his example of what people say about happiness, Aristotle cites an "ancient one and agreed to by the philosophers". According to this opinion, which he says is right, the good things associated with the soul are most governing and especially good, when compared to the good things of the body, or good external things. Aristotle says that virtue, practical judgment and wisdom, and also pleasure, all associated with happiness, and indeed an association with external abundance, are all consistent with this definition.

If happiness is virtue, or a certain virtue, then it must not just be a condition of being virtuous, potentially, but an actual way of virtuously "being at work" as a human. For as in the Olympic games, "it is not the most beautiful or the strongest who are crowned, but those who compete". And such virtue will be good, beautiful and pleasant, indeed Aristotle asserts that in most people different pleasures are in conflict with each other while "the things that are pleasant to those who are passionately devoted to what is beautiful are the things that are pleasant by nature and of this sort are actions in accordance with virtue". External goods are also necessary in such a virtuous life, because a person who lacks things such as good family and friends might find it difficult to be happy.

Questions that might be raised about the definition

Chapter 9 considers the definition of happiness in contrast to an old question of whether happiness might be a result of learning or habit or training, or perhaps divine lot or even chance. Aristotle says that it admits of being shared by some sort of learning and taking pains. But despite this, even if not divine, it is one of the most divine things, and "for what is greatest and most beautiful to be left to chance would be too discordant". Aristotle's discussion of how chance can make happiness possible or impossible, such that we would not call Priam a happy man, only because of his unhappy old age, leads to the next chapter 10.

Chapter 10 returns to question the definition's insistence on happiness being over a whole life. It might even seem completely absurd to wait until someone is dead to judge whether they are happy, although in reality all this means is that it is only at this time that we can say a human is "beyond evils and misfortunes". This could be objected to, though it raises new difficulties, by considering whether the fortunes of descendants do not somehow affect the eudaimonia of people who have died. Aristotle states that we should step back and ask a more fundamental question about even one lifetime because "we would often call the same person happy and miserable in turns". Aristotle resolves this by saying that what governs happiness is always according to the definition, while a happy person at work in accordance with virtue "will bear what misfortune brings most beautifully and in complete harmony in every instance". Only many great misfortunes will limit how blessed such a life can be, but even then "even in these circumstances something beautiful shines through".

Chapter 11 then returns to a point made during chapter 10, saying that it "seems too unfeeling and contrary to people's opinions" to have implied that "the fortunes of one's descendants and all one's friends have no influence at all". He deals with this quickly saying that it seems that if anything at all gets through to the deceased, whether good or the reverse, it would be something faint and small".

Chapter 12 raises the question of whether happiness is among the things that are praised or among the things that are honored. Aristotle distinguishes virtue and happiness saying that virtue, through which people "become apt at performing beautiful actions" is praiseworthy, while happiness is something more important, like god, "since every one of us does everything else for the sake of this, and we set down the source and cause of good things as something honored and divine".

From defining happiness to discussion of virtue: introduction to the rest of the Ethics

Chapter 13. According to the definition of happiness given, we should look at virtue in order to understand it, because happiness will be in accordance with virtue. As confirmation, Aristotle refers us also to his remark in chapter 2 that happiness would be a target of the political art, and he now points out that law makers try to achieve happiness by trying to make citizens good and obedient to laws. Furthermore, we know that ethics, and the political art, must look at the human soul, just as a doctor wanting to cure eyes may have to look to the whole body of a patient.

Aristotle asserts that we can usefully accept some things which are said about the soul, including the division of the soul into rational and irrational parts, and the further division of the irrational parts into two parts also:

• One irrational part of the human soul is "not human" but "vegetative" and at most work during sleep, when virtue is least obvious.
• A second irrational part of the human soul is however able to share in reason in some way. We see this because we know there is something "desiring and generally appetitive" in the soul which can on different occasions in different people either oppose reason, or obey it - thus being rational just as we would be rational when we listen to a father being rational.

The virtues then will be similarly divided, into intellectual (dianoetic) virtues, and the virtues of character (ethical or moral virtues) pertaining to the irrational part of the soul which can take part in reason.

These virtues of character, or "moral virtues" as they are often translated, become the central topic in Book II.

Book 2: Concerning excellence of character or moral virtue

Book 1 had ended by pointing to the importance of virtue of character (moral virtue) as a pre-condition for happiness and the highest virtues. Book 2 concerns this virtue of character. Chapter 1 points out that whereas virtue in thinking, needing teaching, experience and time, virtue of character comes about as a consequence of following the right habits. According to Aristotle the potential for this is by nature in humans, but whether virtues come to be present or not is not determined by human nature.

Chapter 2 once more reminds that we should not try to speak too precisely in any discourse where the material makes it inappropriate. When it comes to deciding what are the actions we should choose in order to develop and hold a good character, we should always look at all circumstances surrounding an occasion. With this approach in mind, Aristotle says that we can describe virtues as things which are destroyed by deficiency or excess. Someone who runs away becomes a coward, while someone who fears nothing is rash. In this way the virtue bravery can be seen as depending upon a "mean". (For this reason, Aristotle is sometimes considered a proponent of a doctrine of a "golden mean".) People become habituated well by first performing actions which are virtuous, possibly because of the guidance of teachers or experience, and in turn these habitual actions then become real virtue where we choose good actions deliberately.

Chapter 3 points out that virtue is also an aptitude which affects when we feel pleasure or pain. A virtuous person feels pleasure at the most beautiful actions. A person who is not virtuous will often find his or her perceptions of what is most pleasant to be misleading. For this reason, any concern with virtue or politics requires consideration of pleasure and pain.

Chapter 4 begins by pointing out that when a person does virtuous actions, for example by chance, or under advice, they are not yet necessarily a virtuous person. It is not like in the productive arts, where the thing being made is what is judged as well made or not. To truly be a virtuous person, one's virtuous actions must meet three conditions: (a) they are done knowingly, (b) they are chosen for their own sakes, and (c) they are chosen according to a stable disposition (not at a whim, or in any way that the acting person might easily change his choice about). And just knowing what would be virtuous is not enough.

Chapter 5 asks which of the three kinds of things which come to be present in the soul that virtue is: a feeling (pathos), a predisposition or capacity (dunamis), or a disposition (hexis). In fact, it has already been mentioned that virtue is made up of hexeis, but on this occasion the contrast with feelings and capacities is made clearer - neither are chosen, and neither are praiseworthy in the way that virtue is.

Aristotle lists the following as moral virtues as habits which involve finding the correct mean between extreme options: courage, temperance (moderation), liberality (moderation in giving and taking money), magnificence (correctly dealing with great wealth or power), pride (claiming what is due to you), gentleness (moderation with respect to anger), agreeableness, truthfulness, and wit. In some editions of Ethics, different words are used as translations from the original Greek. For instance, in Terence Irwin's translation, the virtues are called the following: bravery, temperance, generosity, magnificence, magnanimity, "the virtue concerned with small honors", mildness, friendliness, truthfulness, and wit. Shame is also given some attention, although Aristotle specifically states that shame is not a virtue.

Book 3: Courage and temperance

Perseus Project Nic.+Eth.1109b

Chapters 1-5: The will

Aristotle divides actions into three categories: voluntary, involuntary (unwilling), and nonvoluntary actions. "Virtue however is concerned with emotions and actions, and it is only voluntary feelings and actions for which praise and blame are given; those that are involuntary are condoned, and sometimes even pitied." (Book III Ch 1, Perseus Project Nic.+Eth.1109b30) Virtues are based on voluntary actions.

Aristotle makes a subtle distinction between involuntary and nonvoluntary actions thus: "A man who has acted through ignorance, then, if he is sorry afterwards, is held to have done the deed involuntarily or unwillingly; if he is not sorry afterwards we may say (to mark the distinction) he did the deed 'not-voluntarily;' for, as the case is different, it is better to have a distinct name." (Book III Ch 1 Perseus Project Nic.+Eth.1110b20) This ignorance is ignorance of the facts of the situation, not ignorance of what is fitting, which cannot be excused.

Aristotle doesn't fully develop the concept of free will, and (following Socrates and Plato) does not mention the possibility of deliberate wrong-doing, only that "It is not about the ends, but about the means that we deliberate" (Book III Ch 3 Perseus Project Nic.+Eth.1112b11) and "choice or purpose implies calculation and reasoning" (Book III Ch 2 ).

Chapters 6-12: Courage, temperance and profligacy

Aristotle next, in keeping with his aforementioned thesis, deals separately with some of the specific virtues, including courage, temperance and profligacy. Courage, Aristotle argues, is largely concerned with the feelings of confidence and fear- highlighted best in the fear of death in battle. Courage is the mean between these two vices and is generally driven by a desire for a sense of honor. Courage is also explicitly connected with pain and pleasure in the sense that it is more painful to face that which frightens us and more pleasurable to flee. It is considered always more courageous to face fears, in particular death in battle. Rashness is discouraged (although courage lies closer to this character trait than its cowardly counterpart). Temperance implies connotations of touch. In a traditionally Aristotelian manner, temperance is described first by what it is not, in negatives, rather than a positive description: it is not self-indulgence or insensibility. To highlight this, Aristotle uses the comparison of the self-indulgent man with the stereotypical portrayal of the spoiled child.

Book 4: Other virtues

Perseus Project Nic.+Eth.1119b

Aristotle describes other virtues, including liberality, magnanimity, amiability, sincerity, wit, and modesty.

Aristotle views magnanimity as “a sort of adornment of the moral virtues; for it makes them greater, and it does not arise without them.” (1124a). In order to be magnanimous it seems that one would have to possess a number of other virtues and act on them accordingly, otherwise it would be impossible to be a great person, and thus it would be impossible to be magnanimous. Aristotle states it is especially important to have honor since it is the greatest of the external goods and it is what great people think themselves most worthy (1123b). Magnanimity puts other virtues into their proper perspective in terms of worth. In the case of honor, it allows a magnanimous person to accept honor from an excellent person since it is the greatest thing an excellent man can give; however, if the person giving the honor is not excellent, then the magnanimous person will disdain the recognition because it is not in accordance with his worth (1124a6). Although a magnanimous person will accept the proper honor, he will not be excessively pleased by it because it is justified by his worth. Since a great person is most concerned with honor, he gives it little value, and we can assume that lesser goods will play a small role in the life of a magnanimous person (1124a19). However, these other goods are still important for Aristotle since someone who has “both virtue and these goods is more readily thought worthy of honor” (1124a22-23). Because one must already possess virtue and be a great person in order to have magnanimity, it is called the “crowning virtue.” The other virtues provide the foundation of a great and virtuous person while magnanimity allows that person to act on those virtues appropriately.

Book 5: Justice

Template:The Works of Aristotle Perseus Project Nic.+Eth.1129a

Justice plays an important role in the ethics of Aristotle. It is the cornerstone of social living and demonstrates the highest comprehension of the virtues. Aristotle thought that justice is important enough to devote an entire book to it in the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle treats justice in the same way that he treats other virtues; but, it is the only virtue that has its own book. This not only signifies the importance of justice to Aristotle’s ethics but also the complexity of the topic. Aristotle finds that two distinct forms of justice are necessary to form a comprehensive theory: general (or universal) justice and particular justice. General justice deals with obeying laws and the relation of virtue to others. Particular justice is placed among the virtues and is divided into two subcategories.

Aristotle begins his discussion of particular justice by providing evidence that Justice is divided into parts and that one of these parts deals with unjust profits from action. First, Aristotle makes note of several vices that are associated with certain activities. Cowardice, for example, is associated with causing a soldier to throw away his shield during a battle (1130a17-19). Aristotle cites several other examples in which a certain vice causes one to act in a way that does not accord with a virtue. However, there are some cases where a person commits an undesirable act and does not possess a corresponding vice that would usually cause that type of act. Often, Aristotle observes, these acts are caused by overreaching (pleonexia). Aristotle describes these actions as follows, “when someone acts from overreaching, in many cases his action accords with none of these vices… but it still accords with some type of wickedness…” (1130a20-22). These acts are a particular form of injustice.

This distinction between other vices and injustice is that particular injustice deals with unjust actions that are motivated by unjust gains. In the previous example, the soldier who deserts his comrades in battle and does so out of cowardice is not acting unjustly. However, if the soldier committed the same act motivated by overreaching, he would be acting out of particular injustice. If the soldier deserted his fellow for an unjust gain of safety at the expense of the other soldiers, then he would be acting in an unjust manner. Because unjust acts are a result of overreaching, they are different from unjust acts in the general sense and as such deserve their own separate place in a discussion of Justice.

Aristotle goes on to elaborate his idea of particular justice. He uses adultery as an example and states, “if A commits adultery for profit and makes a profit, but B commits adultery because of his appetite, and spends money on it to his own loss, B seems intemperate rather than overreaching, but A seems unjust, not intemperate.” (1130a25-29). Person A is unjust because he made an unfair gain as a result of his actions. Here, Aristotle takes the intentions of the agent into account. Since A committed adultery with the intent of making a profit of some sort out of the actions, he was acting unjustly because he made an unfair gain. It is questionable what type of profit person A would gain as a result of these actions, it is doubtful that he is only concerned with wealth and perhaps a more broad definition of profit is appropriate. Person A may be making an unjust profit by seeking to advance his career by committing adultery. Since person B’s actions were caused by a vice and they were not caused by overreaching, they do not relate to particular justice. This is not to say that B’s actions were not unjust; however, B’s actions were caused by intemperance rather than overreaching. What is curious in this example is that Aristotle makes it a point to emphasize that person A commits adultery for profit and makes a profit, which raises the question of whether a person who commits adultery for profit, but fails to make a profit is acting unjustly. This example demonstrates Aristotle’s concern for the intent of the actor. Although both person A and B committed the same act, we have a different way attributing blame (although not necessarily a different name for the act) to the person based upon his motivation.

Aristotle is satisfied that his description of acts of overreaching that produce unjust gain are a different sort than those that fall under general justice and so he concludes that particular justice is distinct from general justice. Particular justice, however, is not different from Justice as a whole. Neither is particular justice only a part of Justice, it is the same as Justice but since it has a different focus, we give it a different name (1130a34-1130b2). Particular justice deals with what is unfair whereas general justice deals with lawless. Aristotle points out that "whatever is unfair is lawless, but not everything lawless is unfair" (1130b12-13). Aristotle divides particular justice in two parts: distribution of divisible goods and rectification in transactions. The first part relates to members of a community in which it is possible for one person to have more or less of a good than another person. Aristotle cites wealth and honor as two of several divisible goods (1130b31). The second part of particular justice deals with rectification in transactions and this part is itself divided into two parts: voluntary and involuntary.

For Aristotle, the correct distribution of goods is the mean between the extremes of too much and too little, this intermediate is called the fair (1131a11-12). The just must fall between what is too much and what is too little and the just requires the distribution to be made between people of equal stature. Aristotle is concerned that, “if the people involved are not equal, they will not [justly] receive equal shares… that is the source of quarrels and accusations.” (1131a23-24). In addition, what is just in distribution must also take into account some sort of worth. The worth of the parties involved is a key difference between distributive justice and rectificatory justice because distribution can only take place among equals. Aristotle does not state what counts as worth, rather, he states it is some sort of proportion in which the just is an intermediate between all four elements (2 for the goods and 2 for the people). A final point that Aristotle makes in his discussion of distributive justice is that when two evils must be distributed, the lesser of the evils is the more choiceworthy and as such is the greater good (1131b21-25).

The second part of particular justice is rectificatory and it consists of the voluntary and involuntary. This sort of justice deals with transactions between people who are not equals and looks only at the harm or suffering caused to an individual. This is a sort of blind justice since it treats both parties as if they were equal regardless of their actual worth. The goal of the judge in rectificatory cases is to restore equality and make both parties whole as they were before the unjust act occurred. The just in rectificatory cases is the intermediate between the loss of the victim and the profit of the offender (1132a13-15). It is somewhat straightforward to measure loss in distributive cases since the loss is of a quantifiable good; however, it is not clear for Aristotle’s account how we should measure the loss of the victim in cases where, for instance, bodily harm was done and it is also difficult to say that the offender made a profit from such an offence. To restore both parties to equality, a judge must take the amount that is greater than the equal that the offender possesses and give that part to the victim so that both have no more and no less than the equal. This rule should be applied to rectify both voluntary and involuntary transactions.

Particular justice is a part of the whole Justice. It is not a different sort of thing from general justice since justice is good at all times and injustice is bad at all times. There is not a qualitative difference between one unjust and another unjust act, likewise, Justice is the same for all things. Since Aristotle describes particular justice as a part of justice, one may mistakenly believe that an injustice under the terms of particular justice is less severe than an injustice under the terms of Justice as a whole because it is not wholly unjust. Particular justice is not a fraction of Justice and any injustice is wholly unjust. Rather, it is more appropriate to think of Justice as a whole and particular justice is how Justice relates to certain cases of distribution and rectification.

A separate description of particular justice is required because the virtues do not form a complete system of justice. General justice is the whole of Justice and each of the virtues fall under general justice. Particular justice fits under the whole of Justice alongside the virtues. This is a good model because particular justice is like other virtues in that Aristotle describes it is a mean between two extremes; however, particular justice is perhaps a little more complicated than a normal virtue. The reason particular justice is necessary is because not all unjust acts are illegal and not all legal acts are just. Particular justice deals with such cases by providing a separate system for determining whether acts are just or not regardless of law. General justice deals with a state of lawfulness. A just person on these conditions is one who follows the law and an unjust person is one who overreaches for goods that involve good or bad fortune (1129b3-5). All well-written laws, if followed, will lead a person to be just on the terms of general justice. Aristotle describes general justice as a complete virtue in relation to other virtues (1129b27-28) because it requires all virtues (done well and finely). A just person is able to exercise complete virtue not only towards herself, but to others as well and for this reason it is the only virtue that is other-directed (1129b31-1130a6). Particular justice takes part in general justice in the same way a virtue takes part in the whole.

Aristotle needs particular justice to cover cases in which one person makes an unfair profit as a result of overreaching. Many of these cases may not be covered by law but are nonetheless unjust. Particular justice allows Aristotle to account for cases in which an injustice has occurred, but the act is not necessarily prohibited by law. For general justice, to be unjust is to act on the whole of vice (and against law). Particular justice does not depend upon a standard vice, rather, it seems that any unjust act that cannot be attributed to a standard vice is associated with overreaching one’s mean. Particular justice completes the whole of Justice for Aristotle because it allows him to discuss Justice both in terms of written law and virtue as well as justice in distribution and rectification independent of written law and virtue.

Aristotle treats Justice the same way in which he treats other virtues. He uses the Doctrine of the Mean and supposes that Justice is the mean between two vices. The vice on either end is called injustice and they are caused by overreaching (pleonexia). The excess of Justice is doing injustice and the deficiency of Justice is suffering injustice (1133b31-32). The excess is doing injustice because the actor is taking more of a thing than what is right. A person who awards too much of a good thing or too little of a bad thing is doing an injustice to another person. The deficiency of Justice is suffering injustice because the victim is awarded less than is right. A person who is given too little of a good thing or too much of a bad thing is said to be suffering an injustice.

Book 6: Intellectual virtue

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Book IV referred frequently to the importance of able to aim at the mean, between two extreme options, in order to try to achieve the praiseworthy moral virtues (aretôn epainetôn) apart from justice. This now raises the question of how we find such a mean.

Both the Nicomachean Ethics Book IV, and the equivalent book in the Eudemian Ethics (Book III), though different, ended by stating that the next step was to discuss justice. Therefore the sequence Moral Virtue, then Justice, then Intellectual Virtues, seems very deliberate.

Aristotle now describes knowing what is too much and what is too little as being the same as knowing the ultimate target when it comes to aiming at the target of the good, the aim of the whole Ethics described in the opening sections. Finding the mean will require finding some sort of boundary-marker (horos) to define the frontier of the mean.

Aristotle has already divided the soul (psuchê) into a part having reason and a part without it. Until now, he says, discussion has been about one type of virtue or excellence (aretê) of the soul – that of the character (êthos, the virtue of which is êthikê aretê, moral virtue). Now he will discuss the other type: that of thought (dianoia).

The part of the soul with reason is divided into two parts:

• One whereby we contemplate or observe the things which have invariable causes.
• One whereby we contemplate the variable things. It is this part with which we deliberate concerning actions.

Aristotle states that if (eiper) recognition depends upon likeness and kinship between the things being recognized and the parts of the soul doing the recognizing, then the soul grows naturally into two parts, specialised in these two types of cause.

Aristotle enumerates five types of hexis which in the soul which disclose truth:

1. Art (Techne). This is rational, because it involves making things deliberately, in a way that can be explained. (Making things in a way which could not be explained would not be techne.) It concerns variable things, but specifically it concerns intermediate aims. A house is built not for its own sake, but in order to have a place to live, and so on.
2. Knowledge (Episteme). "We all assume that what we know is not capable of being otherwise." And "it escapes our notice when they are or not". "Also, all knowledge seems to be teachable, and what is known is learnable."
3. Practical Judgement (Phronesis). This is the judgement used in deciding well upon overall actions, not specific acts of making as in techne. While truth in techne would concern making something needed for some higher purpose, phronesis judges things according to the aim of living well overall. This, unlike techne and phronesis, is an important virtue then, which will require further discussion. Aristotle associates this virtue with the political art. Aristotle distinguishes skilled deliberation from knowledge, because we do not need to deliberate about things we already know. It is also distinct from being good at guessing, or being good at learning, because true consideration is always a type of inquiry and reasoning.
4. Wisdom (Sophia). Because wisdom belongs to the wide, it can not be that which gets hold of the truth. This is left to nous, and Aristotle describes wisdom as a combination of nous and episteme ("knowledge with its head on").
5. Intellect (Nous). Is the capacity we develop with experience, to grasp the sources of knowledge and truth, our important and fundamental assumptions. Unlike knowledge, it deals with unarticulated truths (1142a). Both phronesis and nous are directed at limits or extremities, and hence the mean, but nous is not a type of reasoning, but is rather a perception of the universals which can be derived from particular cases, including the aims of practical actions. Nous therefore supplies phronesis with its aims (1143b).

In the last chapters of this book (12 and 13) Aristotle compares the importance of practical wisdom (phronesis) and wisdom (sophia). Although Aristotle describes sophia as more serious than practical judgement, because concerned with higher things, he mentions the earlier philosophers, Anaxagoras and Thales, as examples proving that one can be be wise, having both knowledge and intellect, and yet devoid of practical judgement. The dependency of sophia upon phronesis is described as being like the dependency of health upon medical knowledge. Wisdom is aimed at for its own sake, like health, being a component of that most complete virtue which makes happiness.

Aristotle closes by arguing that in any case, when one considers the virtues in their highest form, they would all exist together.

Book 7: Evil and pleasure

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Chapters 1-10: Evil

There are three 'undesirable forms of moral character', or evils, namely: vice, incontinence and brutality. Vices are extreme behaviors between which lies virtuous behavior (see earlier section, The Golden Mean). Brutality is often used as a term of reproach ("you brute!"), but in actuality instinctual undesirable animal-like behavior is (Aristotle believed) quite rare in humans. Not all types of brutality are bad; for example, nail-biting is a brutish behavior which may be uncouth, but doesn't really affect morals. Behaving excellently means rising above our brutal animal natures, however, as the heroes and gods did.

Chapters 11-14: Pleasure

Aristotle discusses pleasure in two separate parts of the Nicomachean Ethics (book 7 chapters 11-14 and book 10 chapters 1-5), but both are integrated here for clarity's sake.

Books 8 and 9: Friendship

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Aristotle argues that friends can be viewed as second selves. Just as virtuous behavior improves oneself, friends can improve each other--this is the importance of friendship, and the reason it may be regarded as a type of virtue. The success or failure of a friend can be like one’s own success or failure. Aristotle divides friendships into three types, that of utility, that of pleasure and that of the good. Two are inferior to the other because of the motive; friendships of utility and pleasure do not regard friends as people but what they can give in return.

Friendships of utility are relationships formed without regard to the other person at all. Buying merchandise, for example, may require meeting another person but usually needs only a very shallow relationship between the buyer and seller. In modern English, people in such a relationship would not even be called friends, but acquaintances (if they even remembered each other afterwards). The only reason these people are communicating is in order to buy or sell things, which is not a bad thing, but as soon as that motivation is gone, so goes the relationship between the two people unless another motivation is found. Complaints and quarrels can arise in this relationship.

At the next level, friendships of pleasure are based on pure delight in the company of other people. People who drink together or share a hobby may have such friendships. However, these friends may also part--in this case if they no longer enjoy the shared activity, or can no longer participate in it together.

Friendships of the good are ones where both friends enjoy each other's characters. As long as both friends keep similar characters, the relationship will endure since the motive behind it is care for the friend. Aristotle regarded this as the most noble, and most important, relationship, and in modern English might be called true friendship.

Book 10: Pleasure and politics

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Chapters 1-5: Pleasure (part 2)

See book 7, chapters 11-14 for a complete discussion.

Chapters 6-9: Politics

“For though this good is the same for the individual and the state, yet the good of the state seems a grander and more perfect thing both to attain and to secure; and glad as one would be to do this service for a single individual, to do it for a people and for a number of states is nobler and more divine.” Nicomachean Ethics, Book I Ch ii, translated F.H. Peters (1893: Oxford)

Here Aristotle describes the relationship between ethics and politics, saying that politics is essentially ethics on a larger scale (cf. Socrates' suggestion in Plato's Republic, Book II, that he discuss the justice of the state, rather than of the individual, since the former "is likely to be larger and more easily discernible").

Indeed, Aristotle believes that politics should be a noble pursuit to which ethics is an introduction. The last chapter of the Nicomachean Ethics states “Since then our predecessors have left this matter of legislation uninvestigated, it will perhaps be better ourselves to inquire into it, and indeed into the whole question of the management of a state, in order that our philosophy of human life may be completed to the best of our power.” Nicomachean Ethics, Book X Ch ix, translated F.H. Peters (1893: Oxford). He continues his discussion in the Politics.

Important quotes

• "Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim." - 1094a (Book I, Chapter 1)
• "We have found, then, that the human function is activity of the soul in accord with reason or requiring reason." - 1098a (Book I, Chapter 7)
• "For one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy." - 1098a (Book I, Chapter 6)
• "And happiness is thought to depend on leisure; for we are busy that we may have leisure, and make war that we may live in peace." - (Book X, Chapter 7)

Further reading

• Bostock, David (2000). Aristotle’s Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Broadie, Sarah (1991). Ethics with Aristotle. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Cooper, John M. (1975). Reason and Human Good in Aristotle. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• Hardie, W.F.R. (1968). Aristotle's Ethical Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Kraut, Richard (1989). Aristotle on the Human Good. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Kraut, ed., Richard (2006). The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell. {{cite book}}: |last= has generic name (help)
• Pakaluk, Michael (2005). Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: An Introduction. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Rorty, ed., Amelie (1980). Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics. University of California Press. {{cite book}}: |last= has generic name (help); Unknown parameter |Location= ignored (|location= suggested) (help)
• Reeve, C.D.C. (1992). Practices of Reason: Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Hughes, Gerald J. (2001). Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Aristotle on Ethics. London: Routledge.
• Pangle, Lorraine (2003). Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship. New York: Cambridge University Press.
• Sherman, ed., Nancy (1999). Aristotle’s Ethics: Critical Essays. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. {{cite book}}: |last= has generic name (help)
• Urmson, J.O. (1988). Aristotle’s Ethics. New York: Blackwell.

Versions

• Broadie, Sarah; Rowe, Christopher (2002). Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics: Translation, Introduction, and Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Crisp, Roger (2000). Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-63221-8.
• Rackham, H. (1926). Aristotle The Nicomachean Ethics with an English Translation by H. Rackham. Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-99081-1.
• Ross, H (2002). Aristotle The Nicomachean Ethics: Translated with an Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-283407-X.. Re-issued 1980, revised by J. L. Ackrill and J. O. Urmson.
• Sachs, Joe (1925). Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics: Translation, Glossary and Introductory Essay. Focus Publishing. ISBN 1-58510-035-8.
• Thomson, J. A. K. (1955). The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics. Penguin Classics.. Re-issued 1976, revised by Hugh Tredennick.

See also

• Aristotelian ethics
• Bekker numbers
• energeia
• eudaimonia
• Intellectual virtues
• noesis
• Phronesis
• Virtue Ethics

External links

• Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle with chapter descriptions and direct chapter links for all 10 books
• Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle 350 BC, translated by W. D. Ross.
• Ross translation, eText from the University of Adelaide
• Ross translation, HTML at Internet Classics
• Ross translation, HTML with chapter headings at nothingistic.org
• Ross translation, PDF at McMaster
• Lecture on Aristotle's Nicomachaean Ethics A very complete analysis of Nicomachean Ethics.
• Nicomachean Ethics Sparknote A study guide for Nicomachean Ethics.
• Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by Harris Rackham (HTML at Perseus) with Bekker numbers.
• [1] John N. Hatzopoulos, 2009, “The boundaries of right and wrong - Learning and the human brain”, ACSM BULLETIN, February 2009, pp. 20 – 22.